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+# Decentralized Hub Ownership and Recovery Design (PKI-Based, No Blockchain)
+
+## 1. Keys and DIDs (Conceptual Model)
+
+For each Hub, define three logical components:
+
+### 1. Hub Owner Key (Kₒ)
+
+-   Long‑term key pair defining the **owner** of the Hub DID.
+-   Private key never leaves the user's devices.
+-   DID example: `did:key:<public-of-Kₒ>`.
+-   Ultimate authority for the Hub.
+
+### 2. Hub Operational Key (Kₕ)
+
+-   Key pair used by the **server instance** running the Hub.
+-   Private key stored on the Hub backend server.
+-   Granted authority via a signed **delegation certificate** from Kₒ.
+
+### 3. Recovery Secret / Code (R)
+
+-   High‑entropy secret generated **client-side** (NextJS).
+-   Used to derive Kₒ (e.g., `Kₒ = KDF(R, "hub-owner")`).
+-   Shown **only once**.
+-   **Never stored on any server.**
+
+### Additional Component: Passport DID (Dᴘ)
+
+The user's self-sovereign identity. Contains a verifiable claim linking
+the user to ownership of the Hub DID.
+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## 2. Creating a Hub and Binding Ownership to a Passport
+
+### Step 1: Generate Owner Identity (Client-Side)
+
+1.  Generate random secret `R`.
+2.  Derive owner key pair `Kₒ`.
+3.  Compute Hub DID: `Dᴴ = did:key:<pub(Kₒ)>`.
+4.  Show recovery code R to user for offline storage.
+
+### Step 2: Create Operational Identity (Server-Side)
+
+1.  Server generates new key pair `Kₕ`.
+2.  Client fetches `pub(Kₕ)` securely.
+
+### Step 3: Delegate Authority (Client → Server)
+
+Create a delegation certificate:
+
+    {
+      hubDid: Dᴴ,
+      delegatedTo: pub(Kₕ),
+      privileges: ["serve-hub", "sign-hub-messages"],
+      issuedAt: t₀,
+      expiresAt: t₁
+    }
+
+Sign the certificate with `Kₒ`, then upload it to the server.
+
+### Step 4: Bind Hub to Owner's Passport
+
+Add a verifiable claim:
+
+``` json
+{
+  "subject": Dᴘ,
+  "claim": {
+    "type": "HubOwnership",
+    "hubDid": Dᴴ,
+    "role": "owner"
+  }
+}
+```
+
+Signed by the Passport key, optionally also by Kₒ.
+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## 3. Normal Operation
+
+When interacting with other Hubs, a Hub sends: - Hub DID (`Dᴴ`) -
+Delegation certificate (`Kₒ → Kₕ`) - Its operational public key
+(`pub(Kₕ)`)
+
+Peers verify: 1. Certificate signature matches `pub(Kₒ)` encoded in
+`Dᴴ`. 2. Message signatures match `pub(Kₕ)`. 3. Ownership via Passport
+profile (if desired).
+
+**Owner = controls Kₒ**\
+**Server = controls Kₕ (delegated)**
+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## 4. Handling a Server Compromise
+
+If a hacker takes over the server: - They gain `Kₕ`. - They **do not**
+have `R` or `Kₒ`.
+
+The owner must: 1. Launch a new Hub on a new server. 2. Broadcast a
+signed compromise notice. 3. Prove ownership via signatures from `Kₒ`.
+
+### 4.1 Reconstructing Kₒ from R (If Needed)
+
+User enters recovery code R on a safe device: - Derive
+`Kₒ = KDF(R, "hub-owner")`. - Validate that its DID matches the Hub DID
+Dᴴ.
+
+### 4.2 Create New Operational Key (Kₕ′)
+
+New server generates `Kₕ′`.
+
+Owner creates a new delegation certificate:
+
+    Kₒ → Kₕ′
+
+Owner also signs a **revocation** of the old operational key:
+
+    {
+      hubDid: Dᴴ,
+      revokedKey: pub(Kₕ),
+      reason: "Server compromised",
+      revokedAt: t₂
+    }
+
+### 4.3 Broadcasting the Recovery
+
+New Hub publishes: - `hubDid: Dᴴ` - new endpoint - new `pub(Kₕ′)` - new
+delegation certificate - revocation of `pub(Kₕ)` - optional
+Passport-signed confirmation
+
+The attacker cannot: - sign new delegations (requires `Kₒ`) - sign
+revocations (requires `Kₒ`) - change the Hub DID (`pub(Kₒ)`)
+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## 5. Trust Decision Model (No Consensus)
+
+Each Hub or human owner decides independently what to trust.
+
+### Typical Validation Rules
+
+1.  Accept only messages signed by an operational key currently
+    delegated by `Kₒ`.
+2.  Respect revocations signed by `Kₒ`.
+3.  Track a local chain of:
+    -   delegations\
+    -   revocations\
+    -   Passport claims
+
+No global ledger required.
+
+### Human Decision Layer
+
+Owners may also use: - Out‑of‑band communication - Social trust - Direct
+evidence from the Passport DID
+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## 6. Recovery Code Requirements
+
+The design satisfies your constraints:
+
+-   **Never stored on a server.**
+-   Generated client-side only.
+-   Used only to derive `Kₒ` when recovering ownership.
+-   Never transmitted over the network.
+-   Attackers cannot derive R or Kₒ from any server compromise.
+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## 7. Optional Refinements
+
+-   Multi-sig ownership (`Kₒ` split across devices).
+-   Time‑bound delegations.
+-   Owner-signed references to external identities (website, company
+    DID, etc.).
+-   More expressive Passport claims.
+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Summary
+
+This design provides: - **Hub DID ownership backed by PKI**, no
+blockchain needed. - **Recovery mechanism based on a secret code (R)**
+that never touches servers. - **Revocation and redelegation** driven by
+the owner key (Kₒ). - **Human‑centric trust decisions**, no consensus
+protocol.
+
+The attacker cannot permanently hijack a Hub unless they obtain the
+recovery code.